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Mentalizing involves the ability to predict someone else’s behavior based on their belief state. More advanced mentalizing skills
involve integrating knowledge about beliefs with knowledge about the emotional impact of those beliefs. Recent research
indicates that advanced mentalizing skills may be related to the capacity to empathize with others. However, it is not clear
what aspect of mentalizing is most related to empathy. In this study, we used a novel, advanced mentalizing task to identify
neural mechanisms involved in predicting a future emotional response based on a belief state. Subjects viewed social scenes in
which one character had a False Belief and one character had a True Belief. In the primary condition, subjects were asked to
predict what emotion the False Belief Character would feel if they had a full understanding about the situation. We found that
neural regions related to both mentalizing and emotion were involved when predicting a future emotional response, including the
superior temporal sulcus, medial prefrontal cortex, temporal poles, somatosensory related cortices (SRC), inferior frontal gyrus
and thalamus. In addition, greater neural activity in primarily emotion-related regions, including right SRC and bilateral thalamus,
when predicting emotional response was significantly correlated with more self-reported empathy. The findings suggest that
predicting emotional response involves generating and using internal affective representations and that greater use of these
affective representations when trying to understand the emotional experience of others is related to more empathy.
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INTRODUCTION
An important aspect of social intelligence is the ability to
predict someone else’s response and use that prediction to
successfully navigate the social exchange (Humphrey, 1976).
Because people respond to situations according to their own
knowledge and goals, the ability to predict their behavior
requires understanding their mental state at the time, that
is, their knowledge, emotions, intentions and goals (Frith
and Frith, 2006a). The awareness that other people have a
mental state, different from our own, which can explain their
behavior is referred to as having ‘theory of mind’ (TOM)
or ‘mentalizing’ skills (Saxe et al., 2004; Frith and Frith,
2006a,b). Particular neurological disorders, such as autism,
schizophrenia and frontotemporal dementia, are character-
ized by deficits in mentalizing skills which lead to poor
interpersonal relationships and compromised quality of
life (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Brunet et al., 2003; Snowden
et al., 2003; Brunet-Gouet and Decety, 2006). Therefore,
it is important to identify how different components of
mentalizing contribute to the strength of interpersonal
relationships and what neural mechanisms facilitate this
process. Here, we investigate whether affective mentalizing
(i.e. mentalzing about someone’s emotional state) is related
to empathy a process known to facilitate interpersonal
relationships.
Mentalizing incorporates inferring mental and emotional
state from multiple sources, including non-verbal cues, such
as facial expressions and gaze direction, as well as knowledge
about the other person’s perspective and beliefs (Baron-
Cohen, 1995; Frith and Frith, 2005; Frith and Frith,
2006a). The litmus test of rudimentary mentalizing ability
is the false belief task which requires predicting the behavior
of a character with a false belief. In the classic example, Sally
puts a ball in the basket and leaves the room. Ann takes the
ball out of the basket and puts it in the box. When Sally
comes back into the room, where will she look for the ball?
The correct response, that Sally will look in the basket,
requires generating a representation of Sally’s belief about
the situation (Wimmer and Perner, 1983; Wellman and
Cross, 2001). More sophisticated mentalizing tasks, such as
the faux pas task, require integrating an understanding of
False Belief with an understanding of the emotional impact
of beliefs. For example, Amy asks Susan what she is wearing
to the party, only to find out, subsequently, that Susan does
not know about the party and was not invited. Identifying
the faux pas requires understanding that someone uninten-
tionally said or did something they should not have and that
this behavior has emotional consequences (Stone et al., 1998;
Baron-Cohen et al., 1999). Preliminary evidence suggests
that higher level mentalizing skills requiring the integration
Received 12 September 2007; Accepted 11 June 2008
Advance Access publication 8 August 2008
The authors would like to thank Jean Decety and Alison Gopnik for helpful discussion. This work was
supported by a Postdoctoral Fellowship from the MIND Institute, University of California at Davis and an NIMH
Early Career Award K08 MH71746 to CIH.
Correspondence should be addressed to Christine Hooker, PhD, Department of Psychology, Harvard
University, William James Hall, 33 Kirkland St., Cambridge MA 02138, USA. E-mail: chooker@wjh.harvard.edu.
doi:10.1093/scan/nsn019 SCAN (2008) 3, 204–217
 The Author (2008). Published by Oxford University Press. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.orgof knowledge about beliefs with knowledge about emotions
is related to the capacity to empathize with others (Shamay-
Tsoory et al., 2003, 2004). However, it is not clear what
components of mentalizing are related to empathy.
Although both mentalizing and empathy require an
understanding of someone else’s mental or emotional state,
empathy additionally requires sharing the emotional experi-
ence of the other person (Decety and Jackson, 2004; Singer,
2006). Most research thus far has focused on emotion under-
standing, particularly the accurate decoding of emotional
state based on observable cues (also referred to as empathic
accuracy). This research reveals a close connection between
observing, understanding and sharing emotional response,
such that, for example, observing someone else’s sadness
causes sadness in the observer, and this internal experi-
ence (or ‘affective representation’) of sadness, enables the
observer to understand the other person’s emotional expe-
rience (Levenson et al., 1990; Chartrand and Bargh, 1999).
This phenomenon is closely related to perception–action
models of empathy (Preston and de Waal, 2002; Meltzoff
and Decety, 2003) and suggests that people simulate the
experience of others in order to best understand them
(Gallese and Goldman, 1998).
However, there are many occasions in which the other
person’s emotional response is not observable but instead
has to be inferred or imagined. These aspects of ‘affective
mentalizing’ (or ‘affective TOM’) have not been adequately
studied. Nonetheless, it is the ability to predict someone
else’s emotional response which provides the opportunity
to use that affective representation to guide behavior in
ways that prevent harm or promote well-being in others.
For example, imagining how sad a child would be if their
birthday was forgotten can provide motivation to act in ways
that avoid this affective outcome. One possible mechanism,
that we investigate in this study, is that the more vividly the
future emotional response is imagined, the more that emo-
tional representation can help motivate prosocial behavior
which is a primary, adaptive component of empathy
(Batson, 1991; de Vignemont and Singer, 2006).
Mentalizing tasks requiring a representation of belief state
involve multiple brain regions, including the superior tem-
poral sulcus (STS), temporoparietal junction (TPJ), tem-
poral poles and medial frontal cortex (MFC), including the
posterior rostral (prMFC) and the anterior rostral (arMFC)
portions (Frith and Frith, 2005, 2006b; Amodio and Frith,
2006). On the other hand, mentalizing tasks focused speci-
fically on identifying emotional state from observable cues
involve emotion-related brain regions including the amyg-
dala, anterior insula, thalamus, inferior frontal gyrus (IFG)
and somatosensory related cortices (SRC) [including pri-
mary somatosensory cortex (SC I) in the postcentral gyrus,
secondary somatosensory cortex (SC II) and the supramar-
ginal gyrus] (Adolphs, 2003, 2006).
The SRC and IFG, in particular, have been proposed as
regions that facilitate internal modeling or simulation as a
mechanism for empathy. Evidence suggests that the IFG
generates an internal motor representation of observed emo-
tions (Carr et al., 2003) and the SRC generates an internal
somatic representation of emotional states (Heberlein and
Saxe, 2005). Furthermore, lesions in the right SRC produce
emotion recognition deficits (Adolphs et al., 2000).
Current study
We designed a study to isolate neural mechanisms involved
in predicting a future emotional response of another person
and investigate how activity in these neural mechanisms is
related to empathy. Our hypothesis is that activity in neural
mechanisms supporting the representation of affect, particu-
larly the SRC and IFG, when predicting a new emotional
response of someone else will be related to empathy in
every day life.
We created an advanced mentalizing task using static,
visual social scenes with multiple story characters. Each char-
acter’s emotional state depends on their belief concerning
the social situation: one character has full knowledge, i.e. a
True Belief, regarding what is happening in the scene; the
other character has partial knowledge or a misperception, i.e.
a False Belief. Subjects performed two tasks on each of these
two characters: an Emotion Recognition task (i.e. ‘What is
this person feeling right now?’) and an Emotion Inference
task: (‘What would this person feel if he or she had more
information?’). The primary condition of interest is the
Emotion Inference question regarding the character with a
False Belief. In this case, subjects have to imagine and predict
a new emotional response which is different than the current
observable state of that character. We assessed empathy
using the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) which is a
self-report questionnaire considered to be a stable trait mea-
sure of empathy (Davis, 1983, 1996). See Figure 1 for an
example of the task.
The two tasks are not designed to induce and then mea-
sure emotional experience or empathy in the scanner.
Instead, the tasks are designed to put demands on a cognitive
process that is, generating a representation of someone
else’s affective state and then identify whether greater use
of that process (as measured by fMRI activity in regions
responsible for affective representations) is related to the
amount of empathy that the subject reports experiencing
in their daily life.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Twenty healthy, English speaking adults (11 females; mean
age 21 years; range 19–26 years) volunteered and were paid
for their participation. All subjects gave written, informed
consent before participation in accordance with the guide-
lines of the Committee for Protection of Human Subjects at
the University of California, Berkeley. Subjects were screened
for MR compatibility, neurological and psychiatric illness.
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Subjects completed the IRI, which is a 28 item self-report
questionnaire assessing empathy and emotional reactivity
(Davis, 1996). Subjects read each item and rated on a 5-
point scale (0–4) how accurately the statement described
them. There are four subscales of the IRI with seven items
each. Three of the subscales empathic concern (EC), per-
spective taking (PT) and fantasy are designed to measure
different aspects of empathy. The fourth subscale, personal
distress, is designed to measure general emotional reactivity
(Davis, 1996; Davis et al., 2004).
After filling out the questionnaire, subjects completed a
pre-scan comprehension task in which they viewed each of
the 40 social scenes and answered factual questions about
what was happening in the scene. The comprehension task
was designed to familiarize them with the images they would
see in the scanner. Subjects examined each scene until they
understood the scene and then answered three factual multi-
ple-choice questions, e.g. ‘Where is the scene taking place?
(i) in a house; (ii) at a carnival; (iii) at an office’.
Subjects were then shown an example trial for each task
they would complete in the scanner. For the Emotion
Recognition task, subjects were instructed to identify what
emotion the character (indicated by a fixation symbol) is
feeling at the present time based on available cues. They
choose an emotion out of four listed options. In the
Emotion Inference task, subjects are asked what the charac-
ter (indicated by the fixation symbol) would feel if he/she
had a full understanding about what is happening in the
scene. They are asked these two questions for two characters
in each scene in a 2 2 design which yields four trial types:
Emotion Recognition: True Belief Character, Emotion
Recognition: False Belief Character, Emotion Inference:
True Belief Character and Emotion Inference: False Belief
Character.
The social scenarios were inspired from mentalizing tasks
that currently exist in the literature (Fletcher et al., 1995;
Gallagher et al., 2000) but modified in such a way that
both emotion judgments could be made of the single
visual picture. For example, several scenes involve a charac-
ter unaware that a positively or negatively valenced event is
about to happen (e.g. a terrified mother sees that a car is
about to hit her son who is happily riding his bike across the
street, or a sad girl is about to open the door to her house
and is unaware that a surprise birthday party awaits her).
Several scenes involve a misinterpretation (e.g. a wife blames
her husband for breaking a vase when the culprit really is a
young boy who is hiding from her view). Other scenes
involve deception in which one character tricks another
(e.g. a man puts an ‘I’m stupid’ sign on his friend’s back
but the friend does not see it). In all stimuli, one True Belief
Character and one False Belief Character is designated via the
Fig. 1 An example of each trial type with the correct response underlined. In the task, the subject is directed to a particular character by the fixation point and is asked
an emotion inference or emotion recognition question. In this scene, the son, i.e. the ‘True Belief’ character, has brought home a failing grade (shown by the ‘F’ on the paper
he is holding), and he appears afraid as he approaches his father. At this point in time, the father, i.e. the ‘False Belief’ character, has no knowledge of the failing grade, and
appears happy.
206 SCAN (2008) C.I.Hookeretal.fixation cross. The scenarios include between two and four
characters (20% have 2 characters, 65% have 3 characters
and 15% have 4 characters).
The four emotion answer choices remain the same for all
emotion judgments for a single scene. However, each scene
has different emotional facial displays and thus different
emotion answer choices. The following eight emotions were
represented in the task (in one character or another) and
served as answer choices for the stimuli: sad, angry, afraid,
happy, amused, annoyed, confused and embarrassed. These
emotion choices were based on behavioral pilot testing in
which an independent group of subject gave free responses
for the Emotion Recognition and Emotion Inference tasks.
A positive emotion (happy or amused) was always among
the four option choices. Both positive and negative emo-
tions occurred in all trial types, however, specific emotions
were not balanced across the different emotion judgment
conditions. For our primary condition the emotion predic-
tion of the False Belief Character the additional information
sometimes causes the False Belief Character to change from
a positive to a negative emotion (e.g. the father who is bliss-
fully unaware of his son’s failing grade but will be angry
when he finds out) and sometimes causes the emotion to
change from a negative to positive emotion (e.g. a man
believes he is being held-up at gun point, but it is really a
friend using the end of a banana to play a trick on him).
In total, there are 24 scenes in which the FB character dis-
plays a positive emotion (happy, amused) which will change
to a negative emotion (sad, angry, afraid, or annoyed) once
they have a full understanding. Importantly, because we are
contrasting emotion judgments made on the same stimuli
within the same task, we control for task demands as well
as social and emotional content of the scenes.
Each subject completed four fMRI Emotion Inference/
Emotion Recognition scanning runs. The task was designed
as a mixed block/event-related design. Each run consisted of
40 trials which were blocked into 20 consecutive trials of
each task condition: 20 Emotion Recognition trials and 20
Emotion Inference trials. Within each task block, the specific
task trials were presented in a fixed random sequence.
Each scene (including the emotion answer choices) was
presented for 6s with a 2, 4 or 6s jittered inter-trial interval.
The sequence of each run was as follows: a rest period (20s),
task instruction indicating Emotion Recognition or
Emotion Inference block (2s), 20 task trials (6s each
with a 2, 4 or 6s inter-trial interval (ITI)), rest period
(20s), task instruction (2s), 20 task trials (6s each with a
2, 4 or 6s ITI), rest period (20s).
The presentation sequence of Emotion Recognition and
Emotion Inference blocks was counterbalanced across sub-
jects. All pictures were made with the Poser 4 animation
program, (Curious Labs, Inc., Scotts Valley, CA, USA).
Facial expressions were created by using Facial Action
Coding (FACS) algorithms developed for use with the
Poser program.
Image acquisition
Images were acquired at 4 Tesla using a Varian INOVA
MR scanner (Palo Alto, CA, USA) that was equipped with
echo-planar imaging. A standard radiofrequency (RF) head
coil was used, and a memory foam pillow restricted head
motion. E-Prime software (PST, Pittsburgh, PA, USA) con-
trolled the stimulus display and recorded subject responses.
An LCD projector (Epson, Long Beach, CA, USA) projected
stimuli onto a backlit projection screen (Stewart, Torrance,
CA, USA) within the magnet bore, which the subject viewed
via a mirror mounted in the head coil.
Functional images were acquired during four fMRI ses-
sions which began with five dummy scans (with no data
acquisition) and four ‘blank screen’ scans which were subse-
quently dropped from analysis to insure steady state magne-
tization for all analyzed data, resulting in 219 whole brain
volumes per experimental run, and a total of 876 whole
brain volumes for each subject. Images were acquired with
parameters used to optimize signal in regions susceptible to
drop-out due to magnetic field inhomogeneity. Each volume
acquisition included 40, 3.5mm thick coronal slices with
a 0.5mm inter-slice gap, with a phase encode direction
oriented in the superior–inferior direction. A one-shot T2
 
weighted echo-planar image (EPI) sequence (TR¼2000ms,
TE¼28ms, FOV¼22.4cm
2, matrix size¼64 64) was used
to acquire blood-oxygenated dependent (BOLD) signal.
EPI voxel size at acquisition is 3.5 3.5 4mm
3. A high-
resolution 3D T1-weighted structural scan (MPFLASH
sequence) and an in-plane low resolution T2-weighted struc-
tural scan (GEMS) were acquired for anatomical localization.
Data processing and analysis
MRI data was processed and analyzed using SPM2 software.
Each EPI volume was realigned in space to the first scan,
using a six parameter, rigid body, least-squares transforma-
tion algorithm. Subjects who showed >3mm of movement
across the session were dropped from analyses. After realign-
ment, we re-sliced the coronal EPI data to the axial plane,
and smoothed the data 8mm (FWHM). We then created
and estimated a general linear model (GLM), and created
contrast images of the difference between neural activity for
each comparison of interest (GLM and data analysis is
detailed below). These contrast images were co-registered
to the individual subject’s co-planar (GEMS) and high reso-
lution (MPFLASH) anatomical images, resliced to 2 2 2
isotropic voxels and then normalized to the Montreal
Neurological Institute (MNI) atlas space.
In the creation of the GLM, the hemodynamic response
for each event was modeled from the onset of the trial. We
defined each trial type as a covariate of interest: (i) Emotion
Inference: False Belief Character; (ii) Emotion Inference:
True Belief Character; (iii) Emotion Recognition: False Belief
Character; (iv) Emotion Recognition: True Belief Character.
The canonical hemodynamic response function (HRF)
was convolved with brain activity at the onset of the trial
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at 128s, scaled by the global mean, and corrected for serial
autocorrelation. We computed the difference in neural activ-
ity between two trial types of interest and then computed
whether this difference was significant across subjects by
entering the contrast value into a one sample t-test. This
whole brain random-effects analysis was thresholded at
T(19)¼3.58, P<0.001 (uncorrected) and a cluster size of 5
voxels for the group activations and T(12)¼3.93, P<0.001
with a cluster size of 5 voxels for the correlation analyses.
Activity for regions related to a priori hypotheses is listed at
P<0.005. Cerebellum and brainstem activations are not
reported. Only positive activations are shown, unless other-
wise specified.
The correlation analysis was performed by entering the
contrast value of the comparison of interest and then
adding each subject’s score on the IRI as a regressor in
SPM and identifying regions in a whole brain analysis in
which relatively greater activity in the contrast is significantly
correlated with higher scores on the IRI. If regions of a priori
interest showed a significant correlation in the whole brain
analysis, contrast values were extracted from the significant
cluster to determine whether the data contained statistical
outliers (defined as 2.5 SD from the mean). Fourteen sub-
jects provided IRI data and were included in the correlation
analysis. Correlation coefficients of the IRI and specific
regions of interest were determined by conducting bivariate
correlation analyses in SPSS.
RESULTS
Behavioral results
Accuracy for the pre-scan comprehension task was 96% (3)
with a range of 90–100%, suggesting that subjects under-
stood the social scenes. During the scanning session, subjects
performed well on both emotion tasks: Emotion Recognition
accuracy¼90% (8) and reaction time (RT)¼3422ms (416);
Emotion Inference accuracy¼77% (9) and RT¼3655ms
(451). A repeated measures 2 2 ANOVA [(Task: EI and
ER) (Belief: TB and FB)] revealed a main effect of task for
accuracy [F (1,21)¼146, P<0.001] and RT [F (1,21)¼26,
P<0.001], such that participants performed more accurately
and quicker on the Emotion Recognition task. There was no
effect of belief state and no interaction of task by belief state.
Mean accuracy and RT are as follows: Emotion Recogni-
tion: True Belief: accuracy¼89% (7), RT¼3474ms (356);
Emotion Recognition: False Belief: accuracy¼91% (10),
RT¼3381ms (494); Emotion Inference: True Belief:
accuracy¼77(11), RT¼3686ms (453); Emotion Inference:
False Belief: accuracy¼76% (12), RT¼3650ms (457).
Imaging results
Planned contrasts were conducted to isolate neural
activity when predicting another person’s future emotional
response. The primary condition is the Emotion Inference
with the False Belief Character. The planned contrasts
control for task and emotion related elements of the scene:
(i) Emotion Inference: False Belief vs Emotion Inference:
True Belief controls for the task-related process of inferring
a future emotional state; (ii) Emotion Inference: False Belief
vs Emotion Recognition: False Belief controls for directed
attention to the False Belief Character, including that char-
acter’s current emotion; (iii) Emotion Recognition: False
Belief vs Emotion Recognition: True Belief provides a
second control for epiphenomenon related to directed atten-
tion to the False Belief Character. Neural regions that are
sensitive to current characteristics of the False Belief
Character (e.g. conflict detection) should be more active
during emotion recognition of this character whereas
neural regions that are sensitive the ‘True’ emotional content
of the scene should be more active for Emotion Recognition
of the True Belief Character.
Our prediction is that both mentalizing and emotion-
related regions will be active for the emotion prediction,
and that greater activity in primarily emotion-related regions
will positively correlate with empathy.
Main effect analyses
Emotion Inference: False Belief Character vs Emotion
Inference: True Belief Character. In this contrast,
Emotion Inference: False Belief > Emotion Inference: True
Belief, the task question is the same in both conditions (i.e.
‘‘What would this person feel?) and the knowledge state that
the subject is considering while answering the question is the
same (i.e. if everyone had full knowledge). However, the
emotional state will change for the false belief Character
whereas it does not for the True Belief Character. As pre-
dicted, neural regions involved in both mentalizing and
emotion-processing were more active for EI: False Belief
than EI: True Belief. Table 1 lists brain regions active in
this contrast and Figure 2 displays the data.
Emotion Inference: False Belief vs Emotion
Recognition: False Belief. In the contrast, Emotion Infer-
ence: False Belief>Emotion Recognition: False Belief,
subjects make a judgment concerning the False Belief Char-
acter in both conditions. This controls for activity that might
be related to the False Belief Character (e.g. the current emo-
tional expression). There was more activity for EI: FB>ER:
FB in mentalizing regions such as the bilateral STS and bilat-
eral MFC with two separate peaks in the arMFC and the
prMFC. In addition, there was more activity in emotion-
related regions such as the IFG and thalamus. The SRC was
not significantly active in this contrast. Table 2 lists brain
regions active in this contrast and Figure 2 displays the data.
Interaction of Emotion Inference and Emotion
Recognition. We expected a greater increase in SRC and
IFG activity when predicting future emotion vs the current
emotion in the False Belief Character as compared to a rela-
tively smaller increase in activity when predicting future
emotion vs current emotion in the True Belief Character.
This interaction analysis (EI: False Belief ER: False
208 SCAN (2008) C.I.Hookeretal.Belief)>(EI: True Belief ER: True Belief) revealed greater
activity in bilateral IFG and bilateral thalamus. SC I in the
post central gyrus was active at the P<0.005 threshold.
Table 3 lists brain regions active in this contrast.
Emotion Recognition: False Belief vs ER: True
Belief. There was greater neural activity for the ER: False
Belief>ER: True Belief in the right STS/TPJ mentalizing
region. The comparison of ER: True Belief vs ER: False
Table 1 Neural activity in the Emotion Inference task when subjects imagine what the character with a False Belief would feel if he/she had more knowledge
as compared to the same emotion inference question for the True Belief Character
Brain region Brodmann’s area MNI co-ordinates x, y, zt -statistic Volume (voxels)
EI:FB>EI:TB
L. Inferior frontal gyrus 44, 45  44, 18, 22 4.5 15
L. Inferior frontal sulcus 46  38, 32, 22 4.0 194
B. Anterior cingulate cortex (arPFC) 32  4, 40, 16 4.1 21
B. Supplementary motor area (prPFC) 6  10, 8, 56 5.8 57
L. Superior temporal sulcus 37  50,  68, 14 5.2 104
L. Middle temporal gyrus middle portion 21  60,  46,  2 5.5 211
L. Inferior temporal gyrus (Temporal pole) 21  48, 24,  20 3.9 28
L. Lingual fusiform gyrus 37, 18, 19  22,  68,  4 8.8 1548
L. Thalamus extending to pallidum  12,  10, 0 5.3 222
L. Thalamus pulvinar region  22,  28,  2 5.2 143
L. Ventral putamen  20, 6,  10 4.6 11
R. Middle temporal gyrus middle portion 21 62,  42,  4 4.5 90
R. Thalamus extending to pallidum 14,  2, 10 5.9 321
R. Thalamus pulvinar region 10,  30, 2 4.2 18
R. Lingual fusiform gyrus 37, 19 22,  64, 6 7.3 1548
R. Inferior frontal gyrus 44, 45 46, 24, 22 3.5
 
R. Postcentral gyrus (SC I) 3 46,  16, 42 3.0
 
L¼Left, R¼Right, B¼Bilateral.
 Significant at P<0.005.
Fig. 2 Neural activity for each contrast of interest. Data are shown at threshold, P<0.005 to show full extent of activations. The far right panel shows activity for the Emotion
Recognition task with significant activity for ER: False Belief>True Belief shown in red colors and ER: True Belief>False Belief shown in blue. All contrasts show IFG, thalamus
and striatum activity on the axial slices. Medial prefrontal cortex is shown on the mid-sagittal slice and the somatosensory cortex is shown on the sagittal slices.
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including the left IFG and left thalamus. The post central
gyrus was active at P<0.005. Table 4 lists brain regions
active in these contrasts and Figure 2 displays the data.
Relationship of neural activity during emotion predic-
tion and self-reported empathy. To identify whether the
strength of affective representations during emotion predic-
tion is related to empathy in daily life, we computed the
correlation between neural activity during emotion predic-
tion for the False Belief Character (EI: FB) in each main
effect contrast with self-reported empathy on the IRI. Our
primary hypothesis is that neural activity in the IFG and SRC
during emotion prediction (EI: FB>control) will be posi-
tively correlated with empathy.
An overall Empathy score was created for each subject
by summing the scores from the three empathy-related
subscales of the IRI: EC, PT and Fantasy Scale (FS).
Correlations between neural activity during specific con-
trasts and the overall Empathy score were then computed.
(Correlations with the IRI subscales showed overlap in the
neural regions that correlated with the different empathy
subscales, so just the overall Empathy score is reported).
The Personal Distress (PD) subscale is a measure of emo-
tionality. High scores on this scale are not associated with
prosocial elements of empathy (Davis, 1996; Eisenberg, 2000;
Eisenberg et al., 2000). Therefore, this subscale is not
included in the overall Empathy score. We report correla-
tions with the PD subscale separately.
Table 2 Brain regions that were significantly more active for Emotion Inference: False Belief as compared to Emotion Recognition: False Belief
Brain region Brodmann’s area MNI co-ordinates x, y, zt -statistic Volume (voxels)
EI:FB>ER:FB
L. Precentral gyrus 6  42, 4, 36 7.7 2861
L. Anterior insula/lateral orbital frontal gyrus 47  42, 24,  10 6.9 (2861)
L. Inferior frontal gyrus operculum 44 54, 18, 8 5.6 (2861)
L. Middle frontal gyrus 6  42,  2, 58 4.9 100
L. Middle frontal gyrus anterior 9  18, 50, 38 4.9 38
B. Supplementary motor area/dACC (prPFC) 8,32, 6  10, 18, 54 9.7 2321
B. Anterior cingulate cortex (arPFC) 32, 10 2, 56, 18 5.7 (2321)
L. Superior temporal sulcus 21, 39  54,  58, 16 8.8 1029
L. Middle temporal gyrus anterior 21  58,  14,  16 5.2 104
B. Posterior cingulate cortex 23  12,  54, 30 4.7 84
L. Occipital lingual gyrus calcarine 18  18,  72,  4 7.4 3437
R. Occipital lingual gyrus calcarine 17 18,  52, 8 6.5 (3437)
L. Thalamus  8,  18, 12 7.2 147
L. Ventral pallidum medial orbital frontal cortex 25  10, 12,  12 5.5 87
R. Inferior frontal gyrus 44 38, 18, 24 4.0 10
R. Anterior insula 47 32, 22,  6 4.6 59
R. Thalamus 6,  12, 12 4.2 5
L¼Left, R¼Right, B¼Bilateral.
( ) Parentheses indicates that the volume for that activation is included in the larger cluster listed above.
Table 3 Brain regions that are significantly more active for Emotion Inference: False Belief in the interaction (EI:FB–ER:FB)>(EI:TB–ER:TB)
Brain region Brodmann’s area MNI co-ordinates x, y, zt -statistic Volume (voxels)
(EI:FB–ER:FB) > (EI:TB–ER:TB)
L. Inferior frontal gyrus triagonal 45  40, 26, 12 5.0 394
L. Inferior frontal gyrus operculum 44  46, 14, 8 4.1 (394)
B. SMA dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (prPFC) 32  6, 16, 46 6.6 1118
B. Anterior cingulate cortex (arPFC) 32  4, 42, 18 5.4 451
L. Middle temporal gyrus middle portion 37, 21  52,  46,  8 4.5 113
L. Temporal pole 38  50, 24,  22 4.2 21
L. Lingual fusiform gyrus 37, 18, 19  24,  62,  6 8.8 4043
R. Lingual fusiform gyrus 37, 19 26,  58,  16 7.2 (4043)
L. Thalamus extending to pallidum  10,  14, 0 6.8 505
L. Putamen pallidum  28, 14,  4 6.5 551
L. Head of the caudate  12, 2, 14 3.9 12
R. Inferior frontal gyrus 44 42, 26, 18 3.9 19
R. Putamen 14, 14,  2 5.6 299
R. Postcentral gyrus (SC I) 3 48,  16, 48 3.2
 
L¼Left, R¼Right, B¼Bilateral.
( ) Parentheses indicates that the volume for that activation is included in the larger cluster listed above.
 Significant at P<0.005.
210 SCAN (2008) C.I.Hookeretal.There were no outliers in IRI responses. If an a prior
region of interest was significant in the whole brain analysis,
contrast values were extracted from these regions and
assessed for outliers.
Neural activity for Emotion Inference: False Belief vs
Emotion Inference: True Belief correlated with self-
reported empathy. Greater neural activity during EI:
False Belief as compared to EI: True Belief in the right
SRC and left thalamus was positively correlated with
more empathy. The correlation of empathy and right
SRC (supramarginal gyrus)¼0.83, P<0.01; empathy and
left thalamus¼0.79, P<0.01. Examination of the contrast
values revealed one outlier in the right SRC. After this
was removed the correlation between empathy and SRC is
still significant (r¼0.75, P<0.01) (Figure 3). Neural activity
in the left IFG was correlated with empathy at a rate just
below the cluster threshold (r¼0.79, k¼3 voxels). The cor-
relation in the right frontal region was centered in the infe-
rior portion of the precentral gyrus (i.e. motor cortex). All
correlations are listed in Table 5. These regions did not
correlate with PD (Table 6).
Neural activity during Emotion Inference: False Belief
vs Emotion Recognition: False Belief correlated with self-
reported empathy. Greater neural activity for EI: FB vs ER:
FB was positively correlated with empathy in the right supra-
marginal gyrus, and right thalamus (see Figure 4). After
removing one outlier, the correlation of empathy and right
supramarginal gyrus was still significant, r¼0.77, P<0.01.
The correlation between empathy and other regions of inter-
est was as follows: right thalamus, r¼0.82, P<0.01; prMPFC,
r¼0.78, P<0.01. See Table 5 for a full list of brain regions
showing a significant correlation. These regions did not cor-
relate with PD.
Neural activity during emotion recognition correlated
with self-reported empathy. In the comparison ER:
FB>ER: TB, there were no regions that were significantly
correlated with empathy. However, greater activity in the left
IFG, right somatosensory cortex, right thalamus for ER: True
Belief as compared to ER: False Belief was correlated with
greater overall Empathy scores. See Table 5 for the full list of
regions significantly correlated with overall empathy. We
extracted data from the left IFG, right somatosensory
cortex, thalamus and amygdala. There were no outliers in
any of these regions. The correlation of empathy and the
right SC¼0.82, P<0.01, left IFG¼0.85, P<0.01, right
thalamus¼0.83, P<0.01 and right amygdala¼0.78,
P<0.01 (Figure 5). Brain activity in the thalamus during
ER: TB>ER: FB correlated with PD.
DISCUSSION
The aim of this study was to isolate neural regions involved
in predicting the emotional response of another person and
identifying whether the strength of emotion-related neural
activity during this process was related to empathy in daily
life. We used a novel, advanced mentalizing task which
required predicting emotional response based on belief
state. In the main condition, subjects were asked what the
character with a false belief would feel if he/she had full
knowledge about the situation. In this condition, subjects
had to generate the representation of a new emotional
state, that is, an emotional state that was different than the
emotion displayed on the character’s face. In the group anal-
yses, neural regions that are involved in mentalizing, such as
the STS/TPJ, MPFC and temporal poles, as well as emotion
processing, such as the IFG, SRC and thalamus were more
active when predicting a new emotional response for the
Table 4 Neural activity in the Emotion Recognition task
Brain region Brodmann’s area MNI co-ordinates x, y, zt -statistic Volume (voxels)
ER:TB>ER:FB
L. Inferior frontal gyrus 45  42, 26, 14 4.0 21
B. Anterior cingulate cortex (arPFC) 32 0, 50, 20 4.0 5
B. Supplementary motor area (prPFC) 32 4, 20, 44 7.6 489
L. Superior frontal gyrus 10  14, 58, 38 5.1 227
L. Inferior parietal gyrus 40  52,  40, 48 4.2 19
R. Calcarine 17 20,  52, 6 4.0 10
L. Thalamus  8,  18, 4 5.9 125
L. Putamen  28, 6, 4 4.0 53
R. Putamen 14, 12,  4 4.4 20
L. Postcentral gyrus (SC I) 3  48,  16, 54 3.0
 
ER:FB>ER:TB
L. Superior frontal gyrus at frontal pole 11  26, 52,  4 4.8 121
L. Middle occipital 39, 19  44,  80, 22 5.0 100
B. Posterior cingulate 23 10,  46, 36 5.7 1661
R. Superior frontal gyrus superior portion 8 22, 12, 54 6.3 249
R. Superior frontal gyrus at frontal pole 11 28, 58, 2 5.7 59
R. Superior temporal sulcus temporoparietal junction 21, 22, 39 50,  54, 22 4.2 378
L¼Left, R¼Right, B¼Bilateral.
 Significant at P<0.005.
Mentalizing about emotion SCAN (2008) 211False Belief Character than when recognizing that character’s
current emotional state or when predicting the emotional
response of the True Belief Character whose emotional
state was not likely to change. The correlation analysis
showed that more activity in primarily emotion-related
regions, particularly the right SRC and bilateral thalamus
when predicting a new emotional state was related to more
self-reported empathy in daily life. In addition, activity in the
right SRC, right thalamus and left IFG during emotion recog-
nition of the True Belief Character as compared to the False
Belief Character was related to more self-reported empathy.
We interpret our results to suggest that when people pre-
dict an emotional response in someone else, they generate an
internal affective representation of the predicted emotional
response; the stronger the affective representation, the more
likely they are to experience empathy in the context of inter-
personal relationships. These findings cannot identify
the causal relationship between emotion-related activity
and empathy. For example, the relationship between neural
activity and empathy could indicate that dispositionally
empathic people are more practiced at generating emotion
representations in the course of their relationships, thus were
Fig. 3 Greater activity for Emotion Inference: False Belief vs Emotion Inference: True Belief in the right SRC (centered in the supramarginal gyrus) and the left thalamus
correlated with empathy.
Fig. 4 Greater activity for Emotion Inference: False Belief vs Emotion Recognition: False Belief in right SRC and right thalamus correlated with empathy.
212 SCAN (2008) C.I.Hookeretal.more likely to use emotion representations in our task. On
the other hand, enhanced neural responsivity in emotion
processing structures may precipitate and/or increase the
likelihood of experiencing empathy in interpersonal
relationships. Though the causal relationship is yet to be
determined, the current findings are consistent with the
idea that people use emotion-related neural mechanisms to
simulate another person’s emotional experience in order to
best understand their thoughts and feelings (Gallese and
Goldman, 1998; Gallese et al., 2004). Furthermore, the find-
ings suggest that more neural activity associated with this
internal representation of affect is related to more empathy
experienced in daily life.
SRC and thalamus
This simulation model of emotion processing and empathy
is best illustrated by data from the right SRC and bilateral
thalamus in our task. Prior research has shown that the SRC
and the thalamus are related to the perception, experience
and recall of emotion (Reiman et al., 1997; Lane et al., 1997b;
Damasio et al., 2000; Phan et al., 2002). Across the group of
subjects, the SRC was active for predicting the new emotion
of the False Belief Character (EI: FB>EI: TB) as well as for
emotion recognition of the True Belief Character (P<0.005,
see results and figures). The correlation analysis shows that
this neural activity, particularly in the right somatosensory
association cortex, was significantly related to individual dif-
ferences in trait empathy. Specifically, neural activity in this
Table 5 Brain regions in which enhanced activity for each contrast correlated with self-reported empathy
EI:FB>EI:TB (Correlated with overall empathy) BA MNI Co-ordinates x, y, zt -Statistic Volume (voxels)
L. Thalamus  16,  12, 4 4.3 7
R. Supramarginal gyrus (SRC) 40 56,  26, 22 5.7 88
R. Precentral gyrus (inferior portion) 44 64, 0, 4 5.4 32
B. Posterior cingulate cortex 23 4,  32, 46 4.3 13
B. dACC (prPFC) 24 8, 22, 38 4.6 5
R. Inferior parietal lobe 7 48,  36, 46 4.5 10
R. Thalamus 22,  28,  2 4.4 3c
L. Inferior frontal gyrus 44  46, 4, 4 4.6 3c
EI:FB vs ER:FB (Correlated with overall empathy)
B. dACC (prPFC) 24 6, 6, 40 4.4 8
R. Thalamus 20,  22, 6 4.7 43
R. Supramarginal gyrus 40 54,  32, 18 5.5 93
R. Supramarginal gyrus 40 56,  30, 30 4.7 (93)
R. Superior Frontal gyrus 6 26,  2, 72 6.4 99
L. Thalamus  28,  10, 14 3.3
 
ER:TB>ER:FB (Correlated with overall empathy)
L. Inferior frontal gyrus 44  46, 18, 4 5.7 12
L. Fusiform 37  38,  62,  14 5.1 44
L. Superior parietal lobe 7  16,  56, 62 4.8 78
R. Postcentral gyrus (SC I) 3 38,  28, 40 5.0 39
R. Supramarginal gyrus (SRC) 40 48,  24, 22 4.4 11
R. Superior frontal gyrus 6 20,  10, 56 6.2 218
R. Superior parietal lobe 7 52,  36, 60 5.6 14
R. Fusiform 37 32,  58,  20 5.7 70
R. Amygdala 34 28,  8,  14 4.3 10
R. Thalamus 18,  24, 4 4.7 28
L¼Left, R¼Right, B¼Bilateral.
( ) Parentheses indicates that the volume for that activation is included in the larger cluster listed above.
¼below voxel threshold.
 Significant P<0.005.
Table 6 The correlation between neural activity in each main contrast with
PD as measured by the IRI
Brain region Brodmann’s
area
MNI co-ordinates
(x, y, z)
t-statistic Volume
(voxels)
PD:EI:FB vs EI:TB
R. Heschl’s
gyrus/posterior
insula
48 54,  18, 12 5.4 38
PD:ERTB vs ER FB
L. Thalamus  10,  8, 0 4.4 11
L. Calcarine
sulcus
19  8,  74, 14 4.1 5
PD:EI:FB vs ER:FB
R. Superior
temporal
sulcus
22 42,  50, 8 5.4 17
R. Middle
frontal
gyrus
9 24, 24, 38 5.4 10
L¼Left, R¼Right, B¼Bilateral.
Mentalizing about emotion SCAN (2008) 213right SRC region during emotion inference of the False Belief
Character (EI: FB>EI: TB and ER: FB>ER: FB) as well as
during emotion recognition of the True Belief Character
(ER: TB>ER: FB) was strongly related to self-reported
empathy.
The somatosensory cortices are involved in the perception
of touch, temperature and pain as well as the monitoring
internal visceral sensations and emotional experiences
(Nolte, 1993). It has been suggested that accessing somatic
information mediated by the SRC is integral to understand-
ing and empathizing with the experience of others by
recreating the observed experience ‘as if’ it was happening
to the self (Damasio et al., 2000). For example, observing
painful tactile stimulation applied to the hand of another
person activates the hand region of SCI in the observer,
and this activity is modulated by the perceived pain intensity
for the other person (Avenanti et al., 2005, 2006; Bufalari
et al., 2007). The inferior portion of the SRC that is related to
empathy in our task has been identified in the literature as
integral to emotion processing. Lesions in this region are
associated with deficits in facial emotion recognition
(Adolphs et al., 2000; Heberlein et al., 2004; Pourtois et al.,
2004). Neuroimaging studies show enhanced activity in this
region of the SRC when imitating facial emotion (Leslie
et al., 2004), identifying emotional state from body motion
(Heberlein et al., 2004; Heberlein and Saxe, 2005), and when
thinking about bodily states, such as nausea, dizziness and
hunger (Saxe and Powell, 2006). Collectively, these data sug-
gest that subjects in our study may have been accessing a
somatic representation of an emotion to make an emotion
prediction and that the tendency to do so is related to more
empathy experienced in daily life.
Activity in SRC was not related to PD, suggesting that SRC
activity when predicting emotion is not related to emotion-
ality, such as panic in stressful situations, but rather is spe-
cifically related to the pro-social components of empathy
including empathic concern, compassion and perspective-
taking (Eisenberg et al., 1995; Eisenberg, 2000).
The thalamus, a region which is broadly involved in emo-
tion processing (Reiman et al., 1997; Phan et al., 2002), was
significantly active when predicting a new emotion as com-
pared to every control condition in our task, and enhanced
neural activity during emotion prediction in each contrast
was significantly correlated with empathy. The thalamus is
active during emotion induction studies, which has led to
the suggestion that the thalamus is integral to the experience
and monitoring of internal feeling states (George et al., 1995;
Kimbrell et al., 1999; Damasio et al., 2000). Thalamic activity
in our task could reflect accessing a representation of a feel-
ing state in order to predict the emotion for someone else.
Neural activity in the thalamus was related to the overall
Empathy score, which is a composite of the prosocial
Fig. 5 Greater activity for Emotion Recognition: True Belief vs Emotion Recognition: False Belief in the left IFG, right thalamus and right SRC, with peak in inferior postcentral
gyrus, correlated with empathy.
214 SCAN (2008) C.I.Hookeretal.subscales, as well as the PD subscale. This suggests that
activity in the thalamus is broadly related to emotionality
which may be beneficial for interpersonal relationships but
may also be disruptive.
Inferior frontal gyrus
Across the group of subjects, the left IFG was involved in
predicting a new emotional state in another person in each
contrast (EI: TB>EI: FB and EI: FB>ER: FB) and it was
active during emotion recognition of the True Belief
Character (ER: TB>ER: FB). Left IFG activity during emo-
tion recognition of the True Belief Character was related to
empathy. However, neural activity in the IFG for the other
contrasts was not significantly related to empathy. These
findings suggest that greater IFG activity in response to cur-
rent, observable emotional and goal-oriented cues are related
to more empathy in daily life. Recent studies are in line with
this interpretation. For example, greater IFG activity when
listening to another person’s actions (i.e. greater mirror-
related activity) is related to higher scores on the PT scale
of the IRI (Gazzola et al., 2006). Greater activity in the region
of the IFG, including the anterior insula, when viewing facial
expressions of pleasantness and disgust was related to self-
reported empathy on the IRI (Jabbi et al., 2007).
Furthermore, psychiatric patients with social functioning
deficits, such as those with autism or schizophrenia, have
less IFG activity during affective mentalizing tasks (Russell
et al., 2000), as well as facial expression imitation (Dapretto
et al., 2006), and among autistic patients greater IFG activity
during facial expression imitation predicts a higher level of
social functioning (Dapretto et al., 2006).
Anterior rostral MFC and posterior rostral MFC
Both the arMFC and the prMFC were involved in predicting
emotional response of the False Belief Character as com-
pared to both control conditions (EI: FB>EI: TB and EI:
FB>ER: FB) and both MFC regions were more active for
emotion recognition of the True Belief Character as com-
pared to the False Belief Character. Furthermore, activity in
the prMFC in both emotion prediction contrasts was corre-
lated with empathy.
Because this region is involved in many different cognitive
and affective tasks, it is hard to pinpoint the function it is
performing when predicting emotional states. Interestingly,
although the arMFC is more consistently involved in emo-
tion and mentalizing tasks (Amodio and Frith, 2006), we
found that prMFC activity in our task was related to empa-
thy. The prMFC is associated with multiple cognitive tasks,
including action monitoring, error monitoring and conflict
detection (Amodio and Frith, 2006; van Veen and Carter,
2002, 2006). However, it is also associated with emotion
processing, including emotion induction and emotion per-
ception (Phan et al., 2002, 2004). Its function in emotion
processing may be to monitor and control emotion-related
arousal (Critchley et al., 2003; Kalisch et al., 2006) or emo-
tional experience (Lane et al., 1997a).
Our results cannot be explained by prMFC activity in
response to conflict detection or error monitoring regarding
the False Belief Character since we found greater activity in
the arMFC and prMFC during emotion recognition of the
True Belief as compared to emotion recognition of the False
Belief Character. Instead, our results seem more consistent
with the idea that during emotion tasks the prMFC is
involved in accessing and monitoring internal emotional
states, and that this process is related to empathy. For exam-
ple, the prMFC is active during induced sympathy when
hearing about another person’s emotional experiences
(Decety and Chaminade, 2003; Shamay-Tsoory et al.,
2005a). PrMFC activity when observing someone in pain
is positively correlated with self-reported empathy on the
IRI (Singer et al., 2004). Interestingly, lesion studies have
shown that both the prMFC and the arMFC are necessary
for mentalizing. For example, it has been shown that
prMFC lesion patients have deficits in PT and deception
detection (Stuss et al., 2001; Gallagher and Frith, 2003;
Stuss and Anderson, 2004; Amodio and Frith, 2006), and
arMFC lesion patients have deficits in faux pas detec-
tion and these deficits contribute to reduced empathy
(Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2003, 2004, 2005b). Our task required
perspective taking in order to identify emotion. Future
research could try to disentangle emotion from perspective
taking to better assess prMFC involvement in emotion
processing and empathy.
Simulation vs reasoning based on belief
Interestingly, our results suggest that the right STS/TPJ
region does not facilitate mental state understanding
through simulation but rather uses a different process. The
right STS/TPJ region was particularly responsive to the False
Belief Character in all contrasts, including emotion recogni-
tion of the False Belief vs the True Belief Character, a pattern
that was different than the emotion-related network.
Furthermore, the right STS/TPJ was not correlated with
empathy. This suggests that the right STS/TPJ region an
area more superior and posterior to the STS region asso-
ciated with biological motion (Allison et al., 2000; Saxe
et al., 2004) may be engaged in reasoning about behavior
based on belief state. This interpretation fits with neuro-
imaging data showing that right STS/TPJ region is more
responsive when processing stories or cartoons in which a
character with a False Belief is present vs absent (Gallagher
et al., 2000; Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003), attributing mental
states that are incongruent vs congruent with the character’s
background (Saxe and Wexler, 2005), processing facial
emotion that is incongruent vs congruent with the narrative
content of the story (Decety and Chaminade, 2003), and
predicting an action motivated by a False Belief vs an
emotional state (Vollm et al., 2006).
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There are several limitations to the current study. First, the
social scenes contained multiple different emotions and the
analyses collapsed across all emotion types. Future research
could investigate whether neural activity for a specific
emotion (e.g. sad vs happy) is more related to empathy.
Second, subjects filled out the empathy questionnaire prior
to participating in the fMRI scan. It is not clear whether this
influenced neural response to the social scenes. On the other
hand, filling out the questionnaire after participating in
an emotion judgment experiment may produce biased
responding to the questions. It would be helpful to gain
a better understanding of how self-report questionnaires
may influence task-related neural activity and vice-versa.
Finally, the social scenes were created using a graphics pro-
gram so that specific elements of the scene could be scienti-
fically controlled. However, scenes using real people may
produce stronger neural response and thus illustrate more
subtle aspects of the relationship between affective mentaliz-
ing and empathy.
In summary, the main finding of this study is that activity
in emotion-related regions, particularly the right SRC and
bilateral thalamus, when predicting a future emotional
response of someone else is related to self-reported empathy.
This finding suggests that people who generate and use affec-
tive information when trying to understand the emotional
experience of another person tend to experience more empa-
thy in their interpersonal relationships. This is consistent
with the idea that people use simulation to understand
others and suggests that using internal affective representa-
tions when understanding others is a strategy that may help
strengthen interpersonal relationships.
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